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ABSTRACT 
 
Network Based Evaluation Method 
For Financial Analysis of Toll Roads. ( December 2009) 
Nevena Vajdic, B.S., University of Belgrade 
Chair of Advisory Committee: Dr. Ivan Damnjanovic 
 
 The design, build, finance and operation of public infrastructure is becoming 
increasingly dependent on participation of the private sector. An imposing amount of 
investment involved in a public private partnership agreement places financial 
institutions in the role of major lenders. The complexity of these agreements creates a 
gap in the information flow between the public sector, the private sector and financial 
institutions as project participants. Additionally, the public sector decisions about the 
network improvement actions add to the complexity of these agreements. The objective 
of this research is to develop a method which will allow an assessment of the effect that 
network improvement actions have on the project’s financial feasibility. Three common 
financial instruments were analyzed: bank loans, bonds and real options. Emphasis of 
the financial feasibility assessment was on the price of the revenue risk, as the most 
important risk in public private partnership agreements. Results have shown that 
network improvement actions can have significant impact on the price of the revenue 
risk. The magnitude of the impact depends on the type of instrument and the position of 
the road link in the network.   
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 The public need for improved and expanded transportation networks constantly 
increases, thus placing higher pressure on the public sector for available funds needed 
for network improvements. In order to bridge the gap between existing and needed 
funds, the public sector is looking into alternative methods of financing projects. 
Although the idea and concept of Public-Private Partnerships (PPP) reaches back in 
history, in recent years the advanced version of this method has served as an alternative 
for project delivery. 
 
BACKGROUND 
 
This research was conducted for the Texas Department of Transportation 
(TxDOT) Research Project No. 0-5881: Quantifying the Effects of Network Improvement 
Actions on the Value of New and Existing Toll Road Projects, in the joint research work 
with the University of Texas in Austin.  The purpose of this research was to develop a 
decision – support process for TxDOT. This process will serve as a tool for the 
evaluation of effects that improvement action on the existing network will have on toll 
roads risk-dependent measures. More importantly, this tool will allow an objective 
evaluation of which network improvements will add the most value to toll road projects.   
____________ 
This thesis follows the style of the Journal of Construction Engineering and Management. 
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The focus of TxDOT 0-5881 research project was on two research areas: 
modeling network enhancements and project risk management. These two research areas 
were divided into four major domains: identification, quantification, specification, and 
optimization. The project was further divided into 11 tasks. The overview of major 
domains along with the position of nine tasks in the project, as it was presented in the 
work plan section of the research project proposal, is presented in Fig. 1-1.  
 
 
Fig. 1-1. Overview of project tasks 
 
The project started with the literature review (Task 1, not included in the Fig. 1-
1) followed with the identification of risks in toll roads. The third task developed the 
process for the identification of competing and feeder routes in the network. In the fourth 
task, the overview of TxDOT current practices and software was presented with the 
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discussion of potential practices. Completion of this task concluded the project area 
related to the identification. 
The purpose of task five was to select and integrate risk-dependent measures 
used for the project valuation with decision making process. The sixth task was focused 
on the definition of network model which will help in accomplishment of research 
objective. In task seven, the implementation of network evaluation model was delivered 
with the emphasis on the simple case study.  
Task eight was focused on the selection of specific risk dependent measures 
which have significant impact on the project value. Task nine provided the developed 
decision-support process. Case study was conducted for the Austin network in task ten. 
Task 11 is a final research report, currently under preparation in the time when this 
thesis is written. 
 The research for this thesis was focused on the project risk management area, 
while the modeling network enhancements area was researched by the University of 
Texas in Austin. Thus, this thesis represents the compilation of the research done for 
tasks two, five, eight and nine. However, in order to present the decision-support process 
developed in this research, the case study is presented for the simple network. The 
details of identification of competing and feeder links, current software and practices, as 
well as the integration of the network model with existing TxDOT tools are not included 
in this thesis. The context of the project risk management area for toll roads used in this 
research is presented in the following section, that is, the context of this thesis. 
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Toll Road Risk Management  
Project finance is one type of PPP where private sector and lenders are 
considering a set of forecasted revenues for their return on the investment and debt-
service assessment (Yescombe, 2002). However, when arrangements between the public 
sector, the private sector, and lenders are negotiated, revenues can only be forecasted 
and the uncertainty of the future outcome makes the revenue the main driver of risk 
assessment in project finance. 
In order to reduce this risk, many strategies have been developed over the years 
for possible risk mitigation. One of the strategies is a non-competing clause in the 
agreement for toll roads that constraints the public sector from improving the existing 
road network within some distance from the road of interest (Ortiz and Buxbaum, 2008). 
Otherwise, the public sector needs to pay the shortfall in the revenue to the private 
investor. Other strategies can be used as well like real options, which can reduce the risk 
exposure for all project participants (Nevitt and Fabozzi, 1995). These real options 
provide flexibility to the public or private sector to prevent potential losses or increase 
the profits. 
Infrastructure projects like toll roads with usage risk usually have debt to equity 
ratio of 80:20 (Yescombe, 2002). This means that the level of debt raised for the project 
will be at this ratio with the amount of equity invested. There are two main sources of 
project finance debt: commercial banks and bonds. Since banks are flexible when it 
comes to the renegotiating loan terms, in the case when the borrower experiences 
problems in debt servicing, these loans are more appropriate for the early phases of 
 5
project development like the construction phase and the start-up phase. For the project’s 
operational phase, bonds are more suitable as the instrument for capital raising since the 
project has established a certain level of continuous operation and some trends in cash-
inflows can be assessed at this phase.   
In either case, the risk assessment on lender side is again focused on the 
forecasted project’s revenue. The credit worthiness of the project will be estimated 
solely on the future, and uncertain, revenue stream. It is critical for both the borrower 
and the lender to price this risk properly. Over the years, many regulations were 
established with the intention to standardize main principles in risk assessment and risk 
pricing for different financial agreements between lenders and borrowers. Nevertheless, 
due to the complex and specific nature of the PPP agreements, some regulations deal 
with the project finance agreements in general, leaving the risk assessment and risk 
pricing to the judgment of experts, as is the case with regulations for the banking 
business (Gatti et al, 2007) 
In this context, public agencies, private investors and financial institutions are 
putting a great effort into the understanding and development of PPP characteristics and 
financial models. This is being accomplished either through research efforts or through 
data gathering from established road concessions throughout the world in an attempt to 
learn from experience. As a part of this process, this research is dealing with 
understanding of the consequences of certain decisions. More specifically, the effect 
decisions made by the public sector regarding the improvements of the surrounding 
network will have on the financial feasibility of the toll road project under negotiation is 
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studied. Particularly, some of the public policies are part of the long term planning 
process and their implementation can affect the project’s performance under the PPP 
scheme either positively or negatively, thus potentially adding to the value of the project 
or detracting from the value of the project. 
 
PROBLEM STATEMENT 
 
Many questions arise in the negotiation phase between project participants in toll 
road agreements.  In order to ensure the successful communication between those 
participating in the negotiation phase, it is important to identify and quantify available 
information related to the project. This identification and quantification should also 
include information about changes in the network structure due to network improvement 
actions. Since network improvements are part of the long-term planning process in 
public agencies, they will be implemented some time in the future, and, consequently, 
change the distribution of traffic flows in the network.  The question is: how will these 
network improvements affect the revenue on the toll road and the project’s financial 
feasibility? 
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RESEARCH OBJECTIVES 
 
This research considers three common financial instruments used in PPPs: real 
options, bonds and bank loans. The first provides flexibility for the public or the private 
sector to reduce and mitigate the revenue risk in the project’s negotiation phase. Loans 
and bonds are widely used for debt raising and they are negotiated between private 
parties which operate the project and financial institutions. For each of these 
instruments, different models are used for the risk assessment and the risk pricing, which 
will be addressed in detail in this thesis.  
 The objective of this research is to develop a method that will create a connection 
between mathematical models used for risk pricing for these financial instruments and 
the network structure. This connection will allow assessment of the impact that changes 
in the network structure have on financial instruments. The purpose of the method will 
be to: 1) provide a solid basis for the objective assessment of the impact that decisions 
made by the public sector, regarding the network improvements, have on financial 
instruments used in toll road agreements; 2) provide a tool for quantification of the 
impact that these changes in the network structure have on the project’s financial 
feasibility; and 3) build a common ground which ensures that the decisions made by the 
public sector are interpreted in a meaningful manner for project managers and decision 
makers, that is, the public sector, the private sector, and financial institutions.  
For better understanding of the behavior of financial parameters with respect to 
different network improvements, sensitivity analysis of these parameters is performed 
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for different values of the links parameters, that is, different incremental increase or 
decrease of the links capacities in the network. 
 
EXPECTED BENEFITS 
 
The evaluation method correlates components of PPP agreements that are related 
to three project participants: the public sector, the private sector, and financial 
institutions. From the literature review, it has been noted that existing methods used for 
risk pricing of financial instruments in toll road agreements do not consider and quantify 
effects of public sector actions like decisions to add the capacity to the network. Thus, it 
is anticipated that this lack of assessment of impact of such decisions creates a gap in the 
information flow between project participants. Some instruments, such as non-
competing clause priced as the real option, are used to address private sector concerns 
about possible future actions from public sector. However, this type of clause only 
relates the associated risk with the pre-specified level of revenue without objective 
assessment of the impact that considered network improvement will have on the revenue 
stream.  
The evaluation method establishes a framework for quantification of network 
improvement effects on financial instruments used in toll road agreements. This method 
creates a common ground for project participants, thus creating a valuable tool useful in 
the negotiation phase. Managers and decision makers benefit from this method because 
it provides an objective basis for the quantification of the public sector actions. 
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Sensitivity analysis of financial instruments with the respect to different increases or 
decreases in links capacities helps in understanding the effect this may have on project’s 
financial feasibility. 
 
ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY 
 
The first chapter provides the background of this research with the problem 
statement, research objectives and expected benefits. Chapter II continues the thesis with 
the in-depth literature review with emphasis on the uncertainty in the traffic and the 
revenue realization, bank loans, bonds, and real options. Research methodology is 
explained in Chapter III. Chapter IV explains basic principles of the network assignment 
process along with the introduction of the mathematical model used for the forecast of 
future traffic flow and revenues on the toll road. A simple network example is 
introduced as a case study. Chapters V, VI and VII explain and define main principles in 
risk pricing models used for bank loans, bonds and real options, respectively. Each of 
these chapters has a sub-chapter dedicated to the sensitivity analysis of parameters with 
respect to different network topologies. In Chapter VIII, obtained results from sensitivity 
analysis are discussed. Chapter IX concludes this thesis with conclusions and 
recommendations for the future research.  
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CHAPTER II 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
The literature review was conducted for the purpose of identification of current 
practices in toll road agreements. Special emphasis was placed on the review of key risk 
parameters, associated uncertainties, financial instruments and risk mitigation strategies. 
Web-based search engines and library resources were primarily used for this literature 
review.  Also, various research reports were reviewed like World Bank research reports 
since this institution is one of major participants in PPP agreements in undeveloped and 
developing countries. Once when the literature was gathered, relative information were 
organized in several groups: principles of project finance, current practices in 
transportation sector, traffic and revenue forecast, and financial instruments used in 
project finance.   
 
PREVIOUS WORK 
 
Project Finance 
Public-private partnership is an arrangement between the public and the private 
sector for development or delivering of a public service or public infrastructure 
(Hardcastle and Boothroyd, 2003). Project finance is one type of PPP with non-recourse 
or limited recourse finance principle (Yescombe, 2002). Non-recourse finance is an 
agreement where investors do not provide any guarantees for the project finance debt; 
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limited recourse financing is any arrangement where investors provide only a limited 
guarantee. Nevitt and Fabozzi (1995) explain that the final goal in project financing is an 
arrangement which will be beneficial for the investor without affecting their credit 
status. This is achieved through the, above mentioned, non-recourse financing.  
Yescombe (2002) defines three major project risks categories: commercial risks, 
macro-economic risks, and political risks. Commercial risks are project specific risks, 
macro-economic risks are external financial risks like inflation risks, and political risks 
are country specific risks. However, at the center of the task of risk assessment for 
project finance is the revenue risk. The revenue is the source for debt repayment and for 
creating returns to investors.  
In the report prepared by the World Bank and Ministry of Construction, Japan 
(1999), 18 different countries are analyzed for the purpose of the review of recent toll 
roads experiences in those countries. It is noticed that in all countries, the participation 
of private sector is significantly present, even for those countries that had tradition of 
toll-free roads.  
 
Transportation Sector 
In the World Bank report (World Bank and Ministry of Construction, Japan, 
1999) as one of key issues for the successful implementation of public-private 
partnerships agreements for toll roads is a strategic network planning. In countries where 
entities involved in the toll road program were established isolated from the general 
network expansion planning program, there was a problem with a coordination and 
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information exchange. Other issues which public transportation sector and government is 
facing, beside planning and institutional issues, are legal and regulatory issues, 
concession contracts and government supports. 
A committee formed to prepare a report on current practice of travel forecast 
models for the Transportation Research Board (2007) reported that the models used by 
Metropolitan Planning Organizations are in use for over fifty years and cannot address 
all new policy concerns. Alexander, Estache, and Oliveri (2000) analyze different 
methodological problems that regulatory agencies and policy makers face in the 
transport sector. They analyze review of concessioner contracts and price regulations in 
order to establish the link between authorities’ impact on the market risk associated with 
the transportation projects.  
Edwards and Bowen (2003), in their analysis of the communication in PPPs, 
point out that the transfer of information between two parties is successful if the 
information is meaningful to both of them. Different perceptions of risks for different 
parties involved place a special emphasis on risk communication in PPP agreements. 
 
Uncertainty in Traffic and Revenue Realization 
Through history of PPP agreements, there were many examples of overestimated 
or underestimated traffic forecasts. Flyvbjerg et.al. (2005) report that half of the road 
projects from the sample of 210 projects had an error in the traffic forecast and actual 
traffic of 20 percent. For example, for the Dulles Greenway assumption was that the 
traffic demand will increase at 14 percent rate for the first six years (Garvin and Cheah, 
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2004). However, the original estimate of 34,000 vehicles per day showed that the 
forecast was to optimistic and the actual average traffic was 11,500 vehicles per day in 
first six months (Fishbein and Babbar, 1996). For these reasons of the traffic forecast 
errors, the government of Chile, for example, provided three possible values for the 
traffic growth: 4, 4.5 and 5 percent, for the offering of concession agreement (Vassallo, 
2006).  
To model the uncertainty in the future revenue, Irwin (2003) and Brandao and 
Saraiva (2008) use properties of the stochastic process such as a geometric Brownian 
motion for the assessment of an option value in infrastructure projects. The type of 
option analyzed in this model is the minimum traffic guarantee and it was modeled as 
the European option. Chiara and Garvin (2007) use two different methods for evaluating 
minimum revenue guarantee: the multi-least square Monte Carlo method and the multi-
exercised boundary method. This guarantee includes a minimum level of revenue that is 
assured to the investor. If the real revenue falls below the specified level, the public 
sector (the government) has an obligation to pay the difference. Chow and Regan (2009) 
use stochastic processes such as geometric Brownian motion to model a future travel 
demand as the key concept in a real options analysis for managerial flexibility in 
network investments. 
 
Bank Loans 
Although projects can be financed from different sources, bank loans are widely 
used for financing the infrastructure projects (Brealey et al., 1996, Nevitt and Fabozzi, 
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1995). Yescombe (2002) reports the growth for project finance bank loan obligations 
grew from 1996 at $42,830 millions in loans, to $108,447 millions in 2001 (source 
Project Finance International). There are 20 major banks in the field of project finance 
with more than 70 percent participation in all project finance loans.  
As the nature of banking business is not simple and includes different types of 
agreements, models that banks use for risks assessment are very complex. Different 
regulations were developed with the intention of standardizing those models. For 
example, new Basel II Accord (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 2004) is a 
regulatory document that regulates banks exposure to loan risk. For each loan the bank 
lends, it needs to provide an adequate amount of a capital to cover potential losses. The 
Basel Committee, in this document, recognizes the probability of default, unexpected 
losses, expected losses and losses given default as the key parameters for credit risk 
analysis. However, there is a lack of quantitative models for the assessment of capital 
requirements for project finance loans according to the new Basel II Accord 
requirements (Gatti et al., 2007). 
 
Bonds 
One of the possible sources which the private sector can use to raise additional 
funds during the project’s operational phase are bonds (Yescombe, 2002). Nevitt and 
Fabozzi (1995) report that the use of bonds as the potential source of debt funds for 
infrastructure projects has increased and it is forecasted that this trend will continue in 
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the future. For example, in 1996 the total of project finance bonds value was $4,791 
millions while in 2001 the total was $25,003 millions (Yescombe, 2002). 
There are three main quantitative methods for pricing of bonds used in the credit 
risk analysis: structural, reduced, and incomplete information approach (Giesecke, 
2004). At the center of the credit risk assessment for bonds is the probability of default 
or probability that the failure of the bond issuer to fulfill the financial agreement with 
bond investors will occur. 
There are several approaches used for credit risk models. Crouhy et al. (2000) in 
their study analyze and compare four credit risk models. Credit migration approach is 
based on the assessment of probability for moving from one credit grade to another over 
some time horizon. Structural approach is based on the assessment of the asset value and 
the probability to default on debt service. Actuarial approach assumes that the 
probability of default, as the only parameter of interest, follows the Poisson process. The 
last credit risk model is addressing the probability of default as function of macro-
variables. 
 
Options 
An option represents the contract between two parties which grants the right to 
one party, but not the obligation to buy or sell an asset for a pre-specified price 
(Trigeorgis, 1998). This right can be exercised at before or on pre-specified date. If the 
option can be exercised before the end of the contract, it is called an American option; if 
it can be exercised only at the end of the contract, it is called a European.  
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The theory of the option pricing dates back to Merton (1973), who derived 
explicit formulas for pricing European call and put options, and the options with the 
boundary condition (down-and-out). Rubinstein and Reiner (1991) and Rich (1994) 
developed pricing formulas for four types of European boundary options: down-and-out, 
down-and-in, up-and-out and up-and-in. Kunimoto and Ikeda (1992) extended the 
problem by developing the valuation formula for European options with curved 
boundaries. Geman and Yor (1996) used a Laplace transform for a derivation of a 
pricing formula based on the fundamental properties of Brownian motion. All these 
methods are developed for pricing of options based on the price of an underlying asset, 
its volatility, and the exercised price as a function of the asset price. 
 
SUMMARY 
 
Through the literature review, the main principles of project finance are 
identified as the starting point of further analysis of toll roads agreements and their 
financial feasibility. Also, current practices in the transportation sector are identified 
with emphasis on communication between participants in these agreements. Methods 
and models used for the addressing of uncertainties in the traffic and the revenue 
realization are presented. The emphasis of the remaining literature review was on 
financial instruments used in toll road agreements: bank loans, bonds, and real options. 
After the literature review was conducted, the research framework and method were 
developed, which is presented in the following chapter.  
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CHAPTER III 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
This research was conducted through several steps: a literature review, 
development of a research framework, development of a method, analysis of existing 
models for risk pricing and testing of the method on a simple case study. The literature 
review served as a basis for understanding main principles and methods related to the 
research problem. In the research framework, key elements in the toll road agreements 
were identified which provided an objective basis for the development of the method. 
The method is further expanded with the analysis of mathematical models used for risk 
pricing for financial instruments, or, in this case, for the revenue risk pricing. Sensitivity 
analysis served as a basis for a better understanding of the effects of different network 
improvements. Also, this sensitivity analysis was used to validate the method through 
comparison of expected and achieved results.  
 
RESEARCH FRAMEWORK 
 
 For the development of the tool for TxDOT which will allow an objective 
assessment of which network improvements can add the value to the existing and new 
toll roads, the research framework was developed. This framework was primarily 
focused on three elements: 
• Identification of project participants in toll road agreements; 
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• Identification of a role of all project participants; 
• Defining the value of the project. 
In order to better understand the connections among project participants and their 
interaction, project participants were first identified. Yescombe (2002) defines project 
participants for a typical toll road agreement. This definition includes seven participants: 
a government, a contracting authority, an operator, a contractor, an investor, lenders and 
road users. Without loss of generality, for this research it is assumed that the government 
and the contracting authority can be represented as one entity – the public sector, 
namely. Also, it is assumed that the operator, the contractor and the investor can be 
assimilated in one entity, namely the private sector. The overview of project participants 
in the context of this research is presented in Fig. 3-1.  
The second element of the research framework was to identify the role of each 
project participant. Following Yescombe’s (2002) explanation, connections among 
project participants are also presented in Fig. 3-1 (adapted from Yescombe, 2002). The 
public sector offers the concession agreement for the toll road. The private sector, when 
it accepts and signs the agreement, provides equity expecting a return on the investment. 
Lenders are investing a significant amount of money creating the project’s debt.  Road 
users, as the most important participant, are using a toll road, and through toll payments, 
they are creating the revenue.  
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Fig. 3-1. Toll road project participants 
 
 However, interactions of project participants are much more complex. The public 
sector, before offering the concession agreement, goes through a project development 
phase. This development phase is part of the long-term planning process when decisions 
regarding the future network topology are made. When the project is in later stage of the 
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development phase, the concession agreement is offered. The most common structure of 
the concession agreement for toll roads is Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) (Yescombe, 
2002). This form of the agreement is also known as Design-Build-Finance-Operate 
(DBFO). Nevertheless, when the public sector is offering the concession to the private 
sector, usually it is asked to provide some form of guarantees or fiscal support for the 
project (Irwin, 2003). These guarantees between the public and the private sector serve 
as a tool for the risk mitigation. Thus, the interaction between the public sector and the 
private sector is mainly tied to the negotiation phase when the concession agreement is 
offered.  
 By the definition of the BOT scheme, the private sector provides the services of 
project design, construction, operation and finance. As mentioned earlier, the most 
common ratio between the debt and equity invested in the toll road is 80:20. Thus, 
beside the equity which it provides, the private sector is looking into available sources of 
funding which have the capacity to provide this significant amount of debt. This creates 
the connection between lenders and the private sector in toll road agreements. As 
discussed earlier, the main principle in toll road agreements is non-recourse financing. 
Non-recourse finance is an agreement where investors do not provide any guarantees for 
the project finance debt. Thus, lenders are relying on the estimates of project’s future 
cash flows for their assessment of the risk.  
 The connection between road users and other project participants is not direct. 
Road users do not participate in the negotiation about the concession agreement nor do 
they participate in the financing of the project. However, they use the road and pay the 
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toll rate for each trip they make. The number of trips they made and the price of the toll 
rate will determine the amount of the revenue which is collected on that road. Thus, they 
are indirectly connected with other project participants as they are primary source of the 
revenue. As mentioned earlier, the revenue risk is the main risk in the toll road 
concessions. Hence, the revenue risk is tied to the number of trips that road users make 
or, in other words, to the traffic risk.  
 A third element of the research framework was to identify and specify the value 
of the project in toll road concessions. As mentioned, this research was focused on the 
development of the decision-support process that will allow the assessment of which 
network improvements add the value to the existing and planned toll roads. In this 
context, adding the value to the toll road project was considered as decreasing the price 
of risks. Explained in detail, the value of the toll road project is determined based on the 
expected cash inflows. The road itself is not a traded asset and the worthiness of the 
project is estimated solely on forecasted cash flows. Since these cash flows are 
forecasted and, hence, uncertain, the worthiness of the project will reflect this risk. The 
higher the risk, the project is worth less. The price of accepting and bearing the revenue 
risk will be high if the uncertainty in the future revenue is high. Thus, adding value to 
the project means decreasing this risk, or, in other words, decreasing the price of the 
revenue risk. Vice versa also holds, decreasing the value of the project means increasing 
the price of the revenue risk. 
 This research framework provided an insight into the key elements of toll road 
agreements. Main project participants were identified as well as their connections and 
 22
interactions. The direction of the research is placed in the context of the project’s value 
and what it means to add or subtract the value of the toll road project. Based on this 
research framework, the evaluation method as the decision-supporting tool is specified 
in the following section. 
  
EVALUATION METHOD 
 
In order to develop the procedure for the evaluation method for financial analysis 
of toll road projects, several steps are proposed. The evaluation method identifies the 
network-based framework subject to changes initiated by the public sector and correlates 
these changes with the financial instruments used in PPP agreements (Fig. 3-2).   
 
 
Fig. 3-2. Network-based evaluation method 
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The first step in the proposed methodology is to assign deterministic Origin-
Destination (O-D) traffic demand to the existing network structure. This step is known 
as the traffic assignment process. Also, this step integrates the correlation of road users 
with other elements. For the given O-D demand, that is, the estimated number of trips 
between origin and destination, the number of trips on each link in the network can be 
determined through a process called traffic assignment. Network topology, links 
characteristics, and parameters determine the distribution of trips among network links. 
Obtained results from this step present the traffic flow on all links, including the toll 
link. Thus, solving the traffic assignment process, traffic flow on the toll link becomes 
known. Forecast of the future traffic on toll link is the next step. Here, a random process 
(geometric Brownian motion) is used for this purpose. The properties and formulation of 
geometric Brownian motion as well as mathematical formulation of traffic assignment 
process are explained in detail in Chapter IV.  
The next step is to correlate the uncertain traffic flow with the revenue. The 
revenue is modeled as the function of the traffic flow and the toll rate. Since the traffic 
flow is uncertain and modeled as a random process, revenue becomes a random process 
also. This step introduces the model for the forecast of future uncertain revenue stream. 
Further, correlation between pricing models for considered financial instruments with 
this uncertain revenue is developed. As it will be explained in following chapters, 
pricing of real options is related only to the uncertain revenue forecast. However, bonds 
and bank loans will create a debt service for the project, which is expected to be repaid 
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from the project’s cash flow over debt service life. Risk assessment and risk pricing for 
these two instruments are related to both the uncertain revenue and the debt servicing. 
The public sector, as the initiator of the PPP agreement, is considering valuation 
of real options as one of the possible strategies for the revenue risk mitigation. The 
private sector is interested in this financial instrument for the same reason, but also in 
other financial instruments like loans and bonds. The purpose of these instruments for 
the private sector is debt raising, which correlates it with financial institutions that are 
able to provide these forms of debt.  In this setting, the proposed method is beneficial to 
all considered project participants. 
As the final step, improvement actions in the network made by the public sector 
are introduced in the model. The sensitivity analysis of the identified financial 
instruments is performed for various marginal increments of network links and results 
are presented in following chapters. This step reveals the sensitivity of the revenue and 
financial instruments to the decisions made by the public sector regarding the increase of 
the capacity on links in the network. The analysis of results improves understanding of 
the effect that adding capacity to the network has on project’s financial performance. It 
also provides an insight into the sensitivity of financial instruments providing the 
information which financial arrangements are more sensitive than others to the changes 
in the network structure.  
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SUMMARY 
 
 The research framework provided an insight into identification of key 
participants in toll roads agreements and their roles and interactions. Also, the value of 
the project is defined as the benchmark for the quantification of which network 
improvements will add the value to the toll road. Based on descriptions and explanations 
provided in the research framework, the evaluation method is developed as the decision-
support tool. First step of the evaluation method, the network assignment process, is 
explained in detail in the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER IV 
NETWORK ASSIGNMENT 
 
Transportation users traverse the network at some costs. These costs can be 
expressed in multiple different ways. Typically, it is expressed as a travel time, but it 
also can be expressed as a cost of gas and toll, delay, or in any measure that the user 
evaluates when selecting their route (Meyer and Miller, 2001). Hence, the term 
generalized cost is often used. The total cost of the travel on some route between two 
points (origin and destination) is then equal to the sum of travel costs over used links on 
that route. Given a set of Origin-Destination (O-D) demand pairs, this concept is used to 
determine link flows through network assignment process, including the flow on a 
planned toll road link. 
 
USER EQUILIBRIUM 
 
Consider A  as a set of all links in the network, U  as a set of all O-D pairs and 
R  as a set of all routes in the network. In general, cost function ac  of link a A∈  can be 
expressed as follows: 
0 t
a a ac c c= +  (4-1) 
where 0ac  is travel cost on link a  and 
t
ac  is equivalent cost value of the toll rate, if such 
exist on the link a .  
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The distribution of the traffic in a network is then determined according to 
Wardrop’s first principle (Wardrop, 1952): all used routes have equal travel time and all 
unused routes have the equal or a greater travel time. In other words, users do not have 
incentives to change their route since they cannot find another route in the network with 
a lower travel time. The distribution of traffic in the network according to this principle 
is called User Equilibrium (UE). 
Consider a link flow ,aV a A∈ , demand between O-D pair ,uD u U∈  and set of 
routes between O-D pair R . In mathematical terms, UE is a solution for the minimization 
of the objective function that satisfies the flow constrains. Objective function is a sum of 
the integrals of the link’s cost functions, (Sheffi, 1984): 
( )
0
min ( )
aV
a a
a A
z V c dω ω
∈
=∑ ∫  (4-2) 
subject to: 
r u
r R
p D
∈
=∑  (4-2a) 
0rp∀ ≥  (4-2b) 
*a ar rV A p=  (4-2c) 
where ,rp r R∈ is a path between O-D pairs and arA is a link-path incidence matrix. Eq. 
4-2a represents a constraint for preservation of all link flows, that is, the fact that all 
traffic demand needs to be distributed through the network. In addition, link flows 
cannot be negative (Eq. 4-2b) and they can be assigned only to routes which connect the 
observed O-D pair (Eq. 4-2c). In these terms, the link-path coincidence matrix arA  has 
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elements of 0 and 1. If the observed link a is on the route rp then the element is 1 and 0 
is otherwise.  
Solving Eq. (4-2) with respect to the given constraints, one can determine traffic 
flows on all links in the network. However, the UE solution reveals traffic flow values 
for the given O-D demand which is here assumed to be deterministic. In other words, for 
the given O-D demand and known network topology, traffic flow on the toll link is 
calculated as deterministic. The next step is to assess and model the future link flow on 
the toll link.  
 
FORECAST OF FUTURE TRAFFIC FLOW ON THE TOLL ROAD 
 
The assumption made here is that the flow on the link of interest follows a 
stochastic process such as a geometric Brownian motion (GBM). This random process 
has been already used in the literature for this purpose (Brandao and Saraiva, 2008).  For 
this research, properties of geometric Brownian motion and its application in this context 
are first assessed and evaluated.  
Brownian motion is a stochastic process ( ){ }, 0X t t ≥ with following properties 
(Karlin and Taylor, 1975): 
- Every increment ( ) ( )X t s X t+ −  is normally distributed with mean tμ  and 
variance 2tσ ; ,μ σ  being fixed, 
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- For every pair of disjoint time intervals[ ] [ ]1 2 3 4, , ,t t t t , where 1 2 3 4t t t t< ≤ < , the 
increments ( ) ( )4 3X t X t− and ( ) ( )2 1X t X t−  are independent random variables 
with distribution defined previously, and correspondingly for n disjoint time 
intervals, where n is a positive integer. 
- ( )0 0X =  and ( )X t  is continuous at 0t = . 
However, since the every increment is normally distributed which allows that the 
underlying variable has negative values, it is not realistic to use this random process for 
the traffic flow modeling. The geometric Brownian motion (GBM) resolves this issue. 
GBM is a process defined as 
( ) ( )exp , 0S t X t t= ≥⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦  (4-3) 
First two moments of this process are 
( ) ( ) 2| 0 exp
2
E S t S s s t σμ⎡ ⎤⎛ ⎞= = +⎡ ⎤ ⎢ ⎥⎜ ⎟⎣ ⎦ ⎝ ⎠⎣ ⎦
 (4-4) 
( ) ( ) ( )2 2 21| 0 exp 2 exp 12Var S t S s s t tμ σ σ⎡ ⎤⎛ ⎞ ⎡ ⎤= = + −⎡ ⎤ ⎜ ⎟⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦⎝ ⎠⎣ ⎦  (4-5) 
Defining the traffic flow as geometric Brownian motion allows the modeling of 
traffic as an uncertain process which evolves over time stochastically. From Eq. (4-4) 
and Eq. (4-5), at each time segment t , traffic flow can be defined with lognormal 
distribution with the known expected value and variance. Thus, uncertainty in the future 
traffic flow on the toll road can be modeled with the lognormal distribution with known 
parameters. 
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The GBM has two properties that were found very useful in this research:   
• Expected traffic increases at some constant rate, 
• Traffic flow at the time t s+  depends only on the traffic flow at time t  
regardless of previous states. 
The first property states that the expected traffic flow on the observed link increases at 
some constant rate. From the literature review, it has been noted that the traffic forecast 
are not accurate and that the prediction of the single rate at which the traffic will 
increase, which is used in practice, is not the best approach. The second property relaxes 
this assumption.  
The second property is known as the memoryless property of a stochastic 
process. The underlying variable does not have any ‘memory’ about previous states. In 
the context of traffic flows, as it was used in this thesis, this can be explained as follows: 
network users have a choice in their trip origination to decide between available means 
of transportation or available routes. This choice will depend on the information that 
users have obtain in the previous time state. Indeed, information about traffic conditions 
is almost instantly available to users, especially with the development of new 
technologies. Thus, users choice of routes or means of transportation is time adjustable 
as the new information becomes available.  
Also, following the Yescombe’s discussion (2002), if the traffic grows above 
expected projection, this is probably not because of the project, but more the result of the 
overall growth in the economy. Similarly, if the traffic is below projection, it can be 
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assumed that this might occur due the economy downturn. Hence, the realization of the 
traffic on the toll road might vary over time due to eternal factors which are out of 
project participants control. Thus, it is realistic to assume that the realization of the 
traffic flow in the next time frame will depend only on the current realization. After this 
analysis of GMB and its application in the context of this research, it is adopted to model 
the traffic flow as the stochastic process.   
Thus, the link flow is defined as follows: 
 a a a tdV V dt V dWμ σ= +  (4-6) 
where aV  is the starting value of traffic flow on the toll link obtained from traffic 
assignment, μ  is a drift rate, 2σ  is a variance, t tdW dtε=  is a Weiner process where 
dt  is a time increment and ( )0,1t Nε ∼ . The future traffic flow can be fully defined by 
knowing its starting value aV , the expected growth rate μ  and the volatilityσ . Irwin 
(2003) suggests that the values for the growth rate and the volatility of the revenue 
process can be extracted from the past data, if such is available, or from similar projects. 
Here, it is assumed that these two values for the traffic flow can be derived from similar 
projects and that they are constant over the concession period. 
 
STOCHASTIC REVENUE PROCESS 
 
The traffic flow on the link of interest is modeled as the geometric Brownian 
motion. Knowing that the revenue depends on the traffic flow and the toll rate, it can be 
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defined that the yearly revenue is equal to the yearly traffic on the toll link and the toll 
rate. Then, the revenue function R  can be defined as follows (Brandao and Saravia, 
2008): 
*a rR V T=  (4-7) 
assuming that aV  is expressed as the annual traffic. From Eq. (4-6) and Eq. (4-7), since 
the revenue function is expressed as a function of the link flow ( )af V , and based on 
Ito’s lemma which is defined as (Trigeorgis, 1998): 
( )2 2 2212a aa a
R R RdR dt dV V dt
t V V
σ∂ ∂ ∂= + +∂ ∂ ∂  (4-8) 
then the revenue can be defined as the process which evolves over time stochastically: 
a r a r tdR V T dt V T dWμ σ= +  (4-9) 
The parameters which determine the behavior of the revenue over time are: starting 
annual traffic flow on the toll link aV , expected traffic growth rateμ , volatility σ  and 
the toll rate rT . 
 
NETWORK EXAMPLE 
 
To illustrate the developed model and the first step, the network assignment, 
consider a simple unique path network example illustrated in Fig. 4-1 (Damnjanovic et 
al., 2008). The network is defined with only one O-D pair and four links with three 
unique paths. Link 2 is a toll road link; link 1 is clearly feeder link, while links 3 and 4 
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are competing.  DA-B represents traffic demand between node A and node B. The first 
path 1p  is consistent of two links: link 1 and link 2; the second path 2p has two links 
also: link 1 and link 3, while third path 3p has only one link, link 4. All links are labeled 
with the link cost function ic and the link flow , 1,2,3,4iV i = . This network, with given 
one O-D pair, allows easy following of the impact that change in the network structure 
(i.e. link’s capacity) will have on the distribution of traffic flows under deterministic O-
D demand. Also, this network allows easy and straightforward categorization of feeder 
and competing links with the respect to the toll link since the methodology for 
identification of these links is not explained in this thesis, that is, it is not part of this 
thesis.    
 
 
Fig. 4-1. Network example 
 
A B
C
4
1 
3
2
DA-B DA-B 
c1, V1 
c2, V2 
c3, V3 
c4, V4 
2p  
1p  
3p  
 34
As mentioned earlier, distribution of O-D demand in the network is determined 
based on Wadrop’s first principle, User Equilibrium. In order to derive the solution for 
the objective function (Eq. 4-2), cost function of link’s performance first needs to be 
specified. Generalized Bureau of Public Roads (BPR) link performance function is used: 
0 1 ,aa a t
a
Vt t c a A
C
β
α⎡ ⎤⎛ ⎞⎢ ⎥= + + ∈⎜ ⎟⎢ ⎥⎝ ⎠⎣ ⎦
 (4-10) 
where 0at  is the free flow time on link a A∈ , α  and β  are model parameters and aC  is 
the link capacity. Values for parameters 0.15α =  and 4β =  are usually used for the 
calculation process (Sheffi, 1984). However, these values indicate that the capacity of 
the link is equal to the traffic flow at travel time which is higher than the free flow travel 
time by 15 percent. Assuming that the capacity of the road is higher, parameter α  is set 
to 0.5 implying that the link’s capacity is equal to the traffic flow at the travel time 
which is higher than the free flow travel time by 50 percent. Also, parameter β  is set to 
1 in order to obtain the linear cost function, so the closed form solution for link flows 
can be obtained. Thus, the following two parameters can be defined: 0a aa t=  
and ( )0 * /a a ab t Cα= . Note that the parameter ab is a function of a link’s capacity aC . 
Assuming that the BPR link performance function can be expressed with the equivalent 
cost of time, Eq. 4-10 becomes:  
* ,   1, 2,3,4a a a a tc a b V c a= + + =  (4-11) 
The parameters of the link performance function are summarized in Table 4-1. 
Demand between A and B is A BD −  = 50,000. Units are excluded for the purpose of 
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generalizing results, but this can be easily relaxed to incorporate different conditions 
(capacity of the link, time equivalent of the toll rate and the link’s free flow time). Link 1 
is considered a feeder link or the link that has a positive correlation with the toll link. 
Any increase in the capacity on the feeder link will positively affect the flow on the toll 
link, and vice versa. Alternatively, the impact of the competing link is negative; increase 
in the capacity on the competing link decreases the flow on the toll road, and vice versa. 
From Fig. 4-1, link 4 can be clearly distinguished as the competing link since it is on the 
path that competes with the toll link 2. Also, link 3, which belongs to the path 2, is 
declared as the competing link. 
 
Table 4-1. Summary of links parameters 
Link No. aa  aC  tc  
1 10 2500  
2 6 2000 0.15 
3 6 2500  
4 8 3000  
 
 
The solution that satisfies the UE condition is a solution to the problem defined 
in Eq. (4-2). If the objective function is expressed in terms of paths flows, then the 
minimization problem becomes: 
1 2 1
1 1 2 2
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3 3 4 4
0 0
0 0
min ( ) ( * ) ( * )
( * ) ( * )
T
p p p
j
pp
z p a b d a b c d
a b d a b d
ω ω ω ω
ω ω ω ω
+
= + + + + +
+ + +
∫ ∫
∫ ∫
 (4-12) 
subject to: 
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3
1
j A B
j
p D −
=
=∑   (4-12a) 
0jp∀ ≥   (4-12b) 
where 1,2,3j =  is the number of paths for a given O-D pair A BD − . 
 The flow on the toll road 2V (path 1p ) can be found by solving the Lagrangian 
(Sheffi, 1984): 
( , ) ( ) *( )jj j A B
j
L p z p D pλ λ −= + −∑  (4-13) 
subject to: 
0, 1,2,3jp j≥ =   (4-13a) 
Solving Eq. (4-13), closed form solution for all path flows is derived as follows: 
1 1 2 1 2 1 31 3 1 3 1
1 2
1 3 1 21 1 1
( ) ( )( )
( )( )
ta a b b b b a a c b b a ap
b b b b b b b
λ λ λ− − + − + + − + − −= − − + +  (4-14) 
1 1 2 1 2 1 31
2 2
1 3 1 21
( ) ( )( )
( )( )
tb b a a c b b a ap
b b b b b
λ λ− + + − + − −= − + +  (4-15) 
4
3
4
ap
b
λ −=  (4-16) 
where 
[ ]
[ ]
2
1 4 4 1 3 1 4 1 3 1 21
2
1 4 1 3 1 2 2 3 41
3 4 1 3 1 2 1 1 2
2
1 4 1 3 1 2 2 3 41
( ) ( )( )
( ) ( )( )
( )( ) ( )
( ) ( )( )
A B
t
D b b b a a b a b b b b b
b b b b b b b b b b
b b a a b b b a a c
b b b b b b b b b b
λ − ⎡ ⎤+ + + − + +⎣ ⎦= +⎡ ⎤+ − + + +⎣ ⎦
+ + − + +
⎡ ⎤+ − + + +⎣ ⎦
 (4-17) 
and link flows are 1 1 2V p p= + , 2 1V p= , 3 2V p=  and 4 3V p= . 
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Having the link flow on the toll link determined, next step is to forecast the 
future traffic in order to model the uncertainty in the future flow outcome. Since it is 
assumed that the traffic flow follows over time the stochastic process, the link flow is 
defined as: 
2 2 2 tdV V dt V dWμ σ= +  (4-18) 
Values for growth rate and volatility of the traffic flow are assumed to be 
constant over time. Then, the process defined in Eq. (4-18) is determined for the given 
time of the concession period. Further, the revenue is equal to 2 * rR V T=  and thus, is 
also a stochastic process:  
2 2 tdR V Trdt V TrdWα σ= +  (4-19) 
Monte Carlo method is used for a simulation of revenue values for the project’s 
operational life.  
 
Standard Error 
If θ  represents a true value of the estimate, a random variable Θ  with the 
distribution ( )2,θ θμ σ  and [ ]Eθ = Θ . If the number of simulations is N and ,n n NΘ ∈  , 
then the mean value lΘ  is the arithmetic average: 
l 1
n
n NN ∈
Θ = Θ∑  (4-20) 
According to the central limit theorem, sample distribution of the sample mean lΘ  is 
approximately normal with a mean θμ  and variance 2 Nθσ .  
 38
Value lΘ is the point estimator for the valueθ  and it is unbiased if the lE θ⎡ ⎤Θ =⎣ ⎦  , 
and biased if the lE errorθ⎡ ⎤Θ = +⎣ ⎦ . Standard error of the estimator lΘ  is its standard 
deviation: 
l( ) l( )SE V NθσΘ = Θ =  (4-21) 
From the last equation, if the number of simulation is increasing, then the standard error 
of the estimator lΘ decreases. 
 The standard error for the revenue value depends on the number of simulations 
and the variance. Since the variance of the revenue modeled as the geometric Brownian 
motion (Eq. 4-19) depends, among other parameters, on the time over which this 
stochastic process is simulated. Thus, the standard error for the revenue is reported in the 
following chapters in sections that are presenting results of sensitivity analysis.  
 
SUMMARY 
 
 Network assignment process provided the solution for the traffic flow on the toll 
link for the given network and the given O-D demand. Geometric Brownian motion is 
introduced as the process for the modeling of future traffic flows on the toll link and 
associated revenues. Analysis of financial instruments is introduced in following 
chapters starting with the bank loans.  
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CHAPTER V 
BANK LOANS 
 
 Bank loans are widely used in PPP agreements as the financial instrument for 
raising the debt. These loans are suitable for the negotiation phase when the project’s 
revenues can only be estimated and uncertain because, in the case if the project has 
difficulties in early stages of operation phase, banks are willing to renegotiate terms of 
the loan. The quality and the strength of the project to service the debt is estimated from 
different parameters, including the main risk in PPP agreements – the revenue risk. The 
approach and the methodology that banks use for the risk assessment in project finance 
agreements are addressed in this chapter. In addition, the identified key risk parameters 
are correlated with the uncertain revenue model used in this thesis as the part of the 
developed method for financial analysis of toll roads. 
   
KEY RISK PARAMETERS 
 
As previously mentioned, the new Basel Accord (Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision, 2005) recognizes probability of default (PD), exposure at default (EAD) 
and losses given default (LGD) as key risk parameters in credit risk analysis. In addition 
to these three risk parameters, for the calculation of the loan’s risk weight, banks need to 
forecast the level of potential credit losses. For this purpose, the new Basel Accord 
defines the distribution of real losses as the necessary input for the assessment of 
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expected losses (EL) and unexpected losses (UL). EL represents the mean of the 
assessed distribution of losses and different bank’s provisions cover them. However, 
banks also need to have covered the certain percentile of the assessed real losses (99.9th 
percentile) and the difference between this threshold value and EL is considered to be 
UL. It is assumed that, in times when the economy has a downturn, banks will be 
covered with the 99.9% of all potential losses. In other words, banks will have the 
probability of 0.1% to become insolvent.  
 
Probability of Default 
As has been noted, it is assumed that the default occurs when the borrower defaults on 
his debt obligations and stays below debt level until the end of the loan life. In other 
words, when the revenue generated from the project drops below the debt repayment 
level and its projected path remains under the debt obligations level, the project is 
considered to be in default. In the developed modeling framework, the probability of 
default is defined based on the event of toll road revenue process that follows GBM 
hitting a barrier lD , where barrier is below starting revenue ( )0lD R r< = , during loan 
life T. The probability that the revenue process will hit the barrier lD  at time interval 
( )0,T  and stay below lD  until the end of concession life T  (e.g. project defaults) can be 
defined as: 
( ) ( ){ },0l lP R t D R T D t T≤ ∩ ≤ ≤ ≤  (5-1) 
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Real Losses 
However, a default event does not imply complete losses. To determine the 
extent of the losses, exposure at default (EAD) and real losses need to be assessed. 
Exposure at default (EAD) represents the amount of loan at risk if the default occurs. 
Again, this does not necessary imply that the whole amount will be lost as there is 
significant “residual value” of the project. This is illustrated in Fig. 5-1. The project’s 
revenue has been dropped below debt service lD  in year lt . The bank has invested some 
amount that is scheduled for repayment at some constant rate lD . Until the default point, 
the lender (bank) has received lt  repayments totaling l lD t , EAD is then: 
( )l l lEAD D T t= −  (5-2) 
 
 
Fig. 5-1. Default Point for loans 
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The loss given default (LGD) is a ratio between the real losses and the EAD. 
When the default occurs the bank is exposed at the level of EAD. As the project 
continues to generate revenue over the remaining time horizon ( )l lT t− , the bank 
recovers some of the losses. The amount that the bank can recover from continuation of 
the project’s operation is a sum of the remaining revenue. The real losses (RL) are then 
the difference between risk (EAD) and the amount that the bank can recover:  
l
l
T
i
i t
RL EAD R
=
= −∑  (5-3) 
From this equation, LGD can be expressed as: 
1
l
l
T
i
i t
R
RLLGD
EAD EAD
== = −
∑
 (5-4) 
Nevertheless, remaining revenues are uncertain since the revenue behaves 
stochastically over time.  If the project defaults, based on the previous definition of 
default, it is uncertain how much the bank can recover from continuation of the project’s 
operation. For example, using the Monte Carlo simulation, if the number of simulated 
paths for yearly revenues over project’s service life is n  and number of simulated paths 
below debt service is m , then the distribution of real losses can be determined for the 
sample size of m  paths as the difference between EAD and the sum of revenues for 
those paths (Eq. (5-3)). The mean of that distribution is EL and 99.9th percentile is the 
threshold level or Value at Risk (VaR). 
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Risk Weighted Assets 
New accord, Basel II, distinguishes two parts of potential losses given default: 
Expected Losses (EL) and Unexpected Losses (UL) (Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision, 2005). EL are losses which banks expect to occur and thus are covered with 
different provisions. EL represent the average level of potential losses. In order to derive 
a corresponding asset weight, Basel II recommends an upper level 99.9% confidence 
interval for losses to be covered by capital reserves. The value of loss expected to be 
exceeded with some probability (i.e. 0.1% for this case) is known as the Value-at-Risk 
(VaR) (Linsmeier and Pearson, 2000). The difference between VaR and EL represents 
UL. 
Basel II requires that banks provide capital requirements that will buffer UL at 
the VaR level. Capital requirements are set to be minimum 8% of UL (Basel Committee 
on Banking Supervision, 2004).  
Regulatory Capital (Tier I) CAR
RWA
=  (5-5) 
where CAR is a Capital Adequacy Ratio (equal to 8%) and RWA is Risk Weighted 
Assets (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 2005). 
Without loss of model generality, the following assumptions are used to calculate 
RWA: the loan is not correlated to any systematic risk factor and maturity adjustments 
are not applicable. Basel II takes into account asset correlation to the systematic risk 
factor for the capital requirement calculation (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 
2005). However, the underlying variable for the credit risk assessment of the project 
finance loans is the revenue. Revenues from toll roads can not be considered as assets 
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nor are they traded on the market (Irwin, 2003). Thus, the correlation of the loan, which 
depends on the estimated project’s cash flows (revenues from toll road) with systematic 
risk factor, is not taken into account.  
Similarly, the maturity adjustment in the calculation of the capital requirement 
addresses the issue of potential downgrades over long-term credits. These downgrades 
represent the probability that borrowers will move from one rating grade to another, or, 
in other words, that the probability of default will change over given time horizon. 
However, as mentioned above, the assessment of credit risk for the revenue-generated 
projects is related only to the revenues. Uncertainty in these cash flows is already taken 
into account since they are modeled as stochastic process. Probability of default is 
increasing over time as the uncertainty in revenues is increasing over time. Changes in 
probability of default are already captured, thus, the maturity adjustment is also not 
taken into account.  
Credit worthiness is related only to the forecasted cash flows hence financial 
viability is fully captured by traffic and revenue models. EL is derived as the expected 
value of real losses distribution. Similarly, VaR is determined at the 99.9% confidence 
level. UL are the difference between EL and VaR (Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision, 2005):  
UL VaR EL= −  (5-6) 
where EL is a mean of a distribution of real losses given default and VaR is 99.9th 
percentile of the same distribution. The capital of the bank is set to cover the gap 
between EL and VaR (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 2005). In order to 
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calculate RWA, the gap needs to be multiplied by a factor 12.5 (reciprocal of 8% 
minimum capital requirements ratio): 
12.5* *RWA PD UL=  (5-7) 
where PD is a probability that the project will default in given year and UL are 
unexpected losses derived from the distribution of real losses for default in given year. 
Here, it should be noted that UL are derived from the distribution of real looses given 
that the project has default in given year. Hence, the distribution of real losses is 
conditional on default.  
Bank’s risk parameters are defined based on uncertain future cash flows solely 
since this property is specific for project finance agreements.  The sensitivity of 
parameters to changes in the network structure is presented in the following section on 
the simple network example. 
 
SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS 
 
The set of input values for Monte Carlo simulation is presented in the Table 5-1. 
Monte Carlo simulation is used for the simulation of paths for revenue given its initial 
value ( )0R . This value is determined from the UE solution for the given network. 
Values for the revenue drift rate μ  and the volatility σ  are assumed and these values 
are adopted from the literature. Drift rate of 5 percent represents the expected traffic 
growth rate and the volatility of 20 percent represents the standard deviation of the 
growth rate. Sorge and Gadanecz (2004) report the average maturity for project finance 
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loans of 12 years for sample of loans with public sector guarantees and 7.5 years for 
sample of loans with and without guarantees. Thus, in this research, the assumed length 
for debt service T is chosen to be 10. Since the toll rate is usually set per mile and, in 
this network example, the length of all links is not discussed, the average toll rate rT  is 
set to 1 for the simplicity of calculation. The ratio between the starting revenue ( )0R  
and the debt level lD  is set to be 1.4 as the level of annual debt service cover ratio for 
standard toll road projects (Yescombe, 2002). The number of simulated paths for the 
revenue process is n = 100,000 and standard error for the revenue simulation is 
SE = 6.2*103.  The total value of debt scheduled for the repayment over time T  is 
16.8*106. 
 
Table 5-1. Summary of input parameters for Monte Carlo simulation for loans 
T  ( )0R  μ  σ  rT  ( )0
l
R
D
 n  
10 2.35*106 0.05 0.2 1 1.4 100,000 
 
 
 
 From the Monte Carlo simulation, the distribution of real losses is assessed given 
that the project defaulted, based on the definition of default used in this research. The 
distribution of real losses is determined for the given network structure parameters 
(Table 3-1) and simulation input parameters (Table 5-1) and these sets are considered as 
the base case. This base case represents results of the proposed methodology for the 
assessment of bank’s risk parameters under uncertain traffic demand. Further, changes in 
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the network structure are introduced as changes in links capacities, thus changes in the 
parameter ib (Eq. (3-8)). The sensitivity analysis of bank parameters provides an insight 
in the phenomena of the impact that different public sector decisions regarding the 
network improvements have on bank parameters and bank’s capital structure.  
 
Distribution of Real Losses Given Default 
As previously mentioned, real losses are determined for the paths that have 
crossed the lower barrier (e.g. below debt repayment level in year 1 and remained below 
this level during the loan life). Based on the definition of default in this paper, this case 
represents the default of the project in 1st year of debt service. In other words, given that 
the project has started the debt service with the debt cover ratio of 1.4, there is a 
probability of default in the 1st year of service as the consequence of the uncertain traffic 
demand. It is assumed that the lender cannot fully recover the outstanding debt, and the 
loan is considered to be in loss. Fig. 5-2 illustrated distribution of real losses. The 
horizontal axis indicates the total losses, while the vertical axis represents the number of 
simulated paths below the debt service.  
 
 48
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
400
50
0
15
00
25
00
35
00
45
00
Losses (103)
N
um
be
r 
of
 r
ev
en
ue
 p
at
hs
 b
el
ow
 d
eb
t s
er
vi
c
 
Fig. 5-2. Distribution of real losses given default in 1st year of debt service 
 
For this baseline scenario, the probability that the project will default in 1st year 
is estimated to be 3.3%. The expected losses EL and Value-at-Risk at 99.9 percent level 
are estimated to be 1,340*103 and 4,290*103, respectively. The unexpected losses UL 
are 2,950*103 and associated risk weight of an asset RWA is 1,220*103. These values 
are calculated parameters for bank’s risk assessment based on the proposed method and 
given network structure under uncertain traffic flow. In the following section, changes of 
the links capacity are introduced as the measure that can affect financial variables and 
financial performance of a project in general. 
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Sensitivity of Financial Parameters  
The stress analysis is conducted to examine the effect of changes in the network 
structure on financial variabless. The stress analysis considers marginal changes in link’s 
capacity at predifined time period. As previously mentioned, in the network structure 
illustrated in Fig. 4-1, link 1 is a feeder link, while link 3 and link 4 are competing links. 
The capacity values are varied from Cmin=1,500 veh/time unit to Cmax=3,500 veh/time 
unit with the marginal increment of ∆C=50 veh/time unit on links 1 and 3. These two 
links are choosen in order to show effects of changes on the feeder versus the competing 
link respectivly.  
It is expected that the increase in the capacity of the feeder link will positivly 
affect risk parameters, thus add to the value of the project. Probability of default and risk 
weight of the asset should decrease as the travel cost on the feeder link decreases, thus 
attracting more traffic to it. As the number of trips on feeder link increases, it will also 
increase the traffic on the toll link. Thus, the higher the number of trips on the toll link, 
the lower the probability it will default on its debt service. In contrast, the increase in the 
capacity on the competing link will detract from the value of the project. 
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Fig. 5-3. Changes in a probability of default for a 1st year of debt service 
 
Fig. 5-3 illustrates the dependency between the probability of default and the 
change in capacity on feeder link 1 and competing link 3. The horizontal axis represents 
the percent change of the link’s capacity and the vertical axis represents the probability 
that the project will default within 1st year of debt service. As the capacity of feeder link 
increases, the probability that the project will default on its debt obligation decreases, as 
it was expected. For competing link 3, the result is reverse. As the capacity of the 
competing link increases, the probability that the project will default increases as well. 
Larger the capacity of the competing link, the more traffic will be attracted to that link 
instead to the toll link.  
As it can be observed from Fig. 5-3, this relation between probability of default 
and capacity change is nonlinear. This means that the probability of default will depend 
on the size of the capacity change and the starting value, (e.g. starting capacity of the 
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link). This is an important implication as it indicates that an initial network structure 
should be measured as strategic consideration when developing projects. Further, the 
change in the probability of default for the competing link and the feeder link is not 
symmetrical. Observing the results from Fig. 5-3, which are related to the increase in the 
probability of default, it can be concluded that decrease in the capacity on the feeder link 
has the higher impact than the increase in the capacity on the competing link. The vice 
versa is not that obvious from results implying that the same decrease in the probability 
of default can be achieved either by decreasing the capacity on the competing link or 
increasing the capacity on the feeder link. The impact these changes might have on the 
probability of default, for this case study, appears to be almost the same. In other words, 
given incremental increase in the capacity on the feeder link has the same impact as the 
same incremental decrease in the capacity on the competing link. 
Fig. 5-4 illustrates the effect of change in network structure on risk weights. 
Similarly with previous figure, horizontal axis is the change of the link’s capapcity 
expressed as the percentage and vertical axis is the percent change of the risk weight of 
the asset. The results are intuitivly similar to the one obtained for the probablity of 
default. For example, an increase in the capacity on the feeder link will lead to the 
decrease in loan’s risk weight. On the other hand, an increase in the capacity on the 
competing link will result in an increase in risk weight. This presentation of network to 
loan risk weight is  more direct and understandable  to lenders. 
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Fig. 5-4. Changes in a risk weight for a 1st year of debt service 
 
Similarly with the interpretation of results for probability of default, the 
incremental change in the risk weight of the asset is nonlinear and asymmetric. 
Observing the increase in the RWA, the marginal decrease on the feeder link has higher 
impact than the marginal increase in the capacity on the competing link. The opposite 
changes on the competing and the feeder link appears to have the same impact on the 
decrease of RWA. In order to gain insight into the magnitude of these effects, results of 
the sensitivity analysis are presented in Table 5-2. 
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Table 5-2. Summary of results for bank loans sensitivity analysis 
Capacity Change  ∆Probability of Default(1st year) ∆Risk Weighted Assets
+10% -40% -45% 
-10% +77% +97% 
+20% -66% -60% 
Feeder Link 
∆C1 
-20% +227% +241% 
+10% +58% +54% 
-10% -43% -45% 
+20% +143% +139% 
Competing 
Link 
∆C3 
-20% -71% -71% 
 
 
Decrease in the PD occurs when the capacity on the feeder link is increased or if 
the capacity on the competing link is decreased. For example, if the capacity on link 1 is 
increased by 10%, the PD will decrease by 40%. The opposite marginal change on link 3 
will decrease the PD by 43%. If the magnitude of these changes rises to ±20% than, for 
the change on link 1, the PD will decrease by 66%, and, for the change on link 3, the PD 
will decrease by 71%. Similar results can be obtained for the changes in the RWA. 
Although there are differences in the magnitude of the change both for the PD and 
RWA, results indicate that these values are close to each other. 
In contrast, the increase in the PD appears when the capacity increases on the 
competing link or decreases on the feeder link. Increase in the capacity of the competing 
link 3 by 10% will increase the PD by 58%. If the capacity on the feeder link 1 is 
decreased by 10%, it will increase the PD by 77%. Similarly, if these marginal changes 
on capacities rise to 20%, the impact on the PD significantly alters. The increase in the 
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PD for the change on the link 3 is 143% while for the change on the link 1 is 227%. The 
impact is thus significantly different for network improvements actions on the feeder 
link 1 and the competing link 3. 
 
SUMMARY 
 
 In this chapter, key risk parameters, which occur in banks regulation, are 
analyzed in the context of toll roads. The revenue risk is used as the primary risk and the 
risk parameters are defined based on the properties of the GBM. Monte Carlo simulation 
is used for the assessment of these bank’s parameters and for the sensitivity analysis. 
Results are obtained for the simple network example in which the feeder and the 
competing link can be intuitively identified. The results have shown that the decrease in 
the capacity on the feeder link has greater impact on risk parameters than the increase in 
the capacity on the competing link. In the following chapter, the identification of key 
risk parameters for the next financial instrument, bonds, is presented. Financial risk for 
bonds is also correlated with the revenue risk and the sensitivity analysis is conducted. 
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CHAPTER VI 
BONDS 
 
As discussed earlier, there are several approaches to model and price the credit 
risk. The common underlying goal in all these models is to forecast the probability of 
default based on some assumptions. For example, in the credit migration approach, the 
probability that the borrower will move from one credit grade to another including 
default is assessed from the value of the borrower’s portfolio (Crouhy et. al., 2000). The 
initial step is to assign the rating grade to the borrower and then to estimate probability 
of moving from one grade to another. This initial rating grade can be accepted based on 
the rating of rating agencies like Moody’s, Standard & Poor and Fitch. 
The actuarial approach is based on the modeling of default as the Poisson 
process. There are no assumptions on why the borrower defaulted and the capital of the 
firm is not related to the default risk. The input in this model is a mean of Poisson 
distribution, or expected number of defaults within given time horizon. Next model, 
CreditPortfolioView, is based on the estimation of macro-variables which are specific 
for each country. The probability of default is conditional on these macro-variables and 
it is modeled as a logit function.  
Structural approach is based on the asset value or the market value of the firm. It 
is assumed that the value follows the geometric Brownian motion and it is equal to the 
sum of future cash flows (Giesecke, 2004). Probability of default occurs when the value 
drops below the debt level. Here, two situations should be distinguished. First, when the 
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value drops below the debt level and remains below for the debt service life, it is 
considered that the obligator has defaulted. This approach to the definition of default is 
called classical approach. First-passage approach defines the default when the value 
drops below the debt level for the first time. It does not observe the remaining debt 
service and the behavior of the value over remaining time.   
Each of these four models was analyzed in order to examine its application for 
the pricing of credit risk for toll roads. Some limitations of these models were observed 
for the intended application. First, the toll road is a stand alone facility which value is 
derived from its forecasted revenues. Modeling revenue as geometric Brownian motion 
captures the uncertainty in the future outcome and, thus, the probability of default can be 
assessed for the whole concession life. Thus, the approach of assessing the probability 
that the value of the toll road, that is, the sum of the forecasted cash flows, will move 
from one credit grade to another is not applicable. Also, modeling the probability of 
default as Poisson process does not apply for this model. As mentioned, the GBM 
captures uncertainty thus allowing the variation in the traffic demand and revenue over 
time.  
However, macro-variables like unemployment do affect traffic demand, and 
these factors are already included in the traffic studies which are prepared before the 
concession agreement is offered. Based on different factors like unemployment or land 
development, expected traffic growth rate will be assessed. For these reasons, structural 
approach is adopted as the model for the assessment of the credit risk for toll roads. The 
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key risk parameters of this model and its application within this research are discussed in 
the following section.      
 
KEY RISK PARAMETERS 
 
Main principles in the structural approach for the credit risk assessment date back 
to Merton (1974). First, the value of the firm is a stochastic variable over time and it is 
the main risk driver of the credit risk. Also, an asset can be traded instantaneously and 
the debt liability is a claim on the asset. Main risk parameter is the probability of default 
or the probability that the obligor will default to repay the debt. Also, in order to price 
the credit risk, the price of the risky debt is compared with the price of the risk free debt. 
The difference between rates of return on these two debts, risky and risk free, is a credit 
spread. 
Application of this approach to the pricing of the revenue risk in toll roads 
required some assumptions. First assumption is that the revenue, modeled as the 
stochastic process and the source for the debt repayment, is the claim for the debt 
liability. This means that, in the case of default, the bond investor will receive remaining 
revenue collected from the continuation of the road service. Second, the default occurs 
when the revenue process drops below the debt level and remains below for the debt 
service life (classical approach). This definition of default is the same as in the analysis 
of bank loans (Chapter V). Since the probability of default was already analyzed in the 
 58
Chapter V, following section explains in detail the model for the risk pricing, that is, the 
model for the assessment of the credit spread. 
 
Credit Spread  
Investors in a bond market will observe the credit spread of an offered bond as 
parameter for their return on investment and associated risk. Investor makes a decision 
based on the risk and adequate compensation which integrated in a bond price about 
purchasing the bond or not. Yield is the actual return on the bond that investor will earn. 
For example, if the bond is selling for a price P with a face value K  and a coupon 
payment C  and has a maturityT , than from equation: 
( ) ( )1 1 1
T
t T
t
C KP
r r=
= ++ +∑  (6-1) 
r  is the rate of a return for the investor, or the yield.  
Credit spread is a difference between the yield of a risky bond and the yield of a 
risk free bond. In theory, it can be assumed that there exist a risk free bond and usually, 
practitioners use the yield of a government or a treasury bond with similar maturity for 
the calculation process.  Risky bond can be defined as the bond that has some probability 
of default. Same as the definition above, the probability of default is the probability that 
the bond issuer will fail on the repayment of promised coupon rate or principle at the 
maturity. Price of the bond is determined in such a way that includes this risk. In other 
words, price of the risky bond will be lower than the risk free bond because of the 
reduction caused by the price of the associated risk. The yield of the risky bond is higher 
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than the yield of the risk free bond. The explanation of the pricing method for the 
revenue-generated projects is presented in Fig. 6-1.  
 
 
Fig. 6-1. Default point for bonds 
 
Total amount of debt that is planned to be raised is defined as bD . Further, it is 
assume that the loan is planned to be repaid through equally yearly repayments bC and 
the debt life is bT . If the revenue R is higher than the bC  for the whole debt service bT , 
than the bondholder receives all promised payments. If R  drops below bC  during the 
debt service at some time [ ]0,b bt T∈ , bondholder will receive remaining revenue and it 
will experience a lost of: 
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C T t R
=
− −∑  (6-2) 
This position of the bondholder is the same as he had sold the American put 
option with the strike price ( )b b bC T t−  and maturity bT . American option is a type of the 
option that can be exercised at any time of option’s life. This is equivalent to the 
definition of the default as it can occur at any time of the debt service. Further, put 
option is a type of the option that is used for the risk hedging when the price of the asset 
is expected to decrease. The seller of the put option accepts the obligation to buy the 
underlying asset for the pre-specified price, the exercised price, if the value of the asset 
drops below some level, the strike price. If the asset never falls below the strike price 
until maturity, the seller will earn the provision of selling this put option.  
Thus, the bond investor accepts the risk that the revenue will drop below the debt 
service, and that risk is incorporated in the exercised price. The value of that option 
reflects the price of the default risk and it is determined as the average over all possible 
realizations. The realization is positive for the bondholder when he receives the payment 
as promised and there is no risk, thus the value of the option is 0. If the realization is 
negative, the bondholder will receive only available amount. Thus, the value of the 
option is equal to the difference between the strike price and the available amount. 
In the context of the toll road and the revenue risk, the price of the option to 
accept the revenue risk is equal to: 
( )max 0, b
b
T
b b b i
i t
C T t R
=
⎛ ⎞− −⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠∑  (6-3) 
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where ( )b b bC T t−  is the remaining value of the debt repayment at time of default bt  and 
b
b
T
i
i t
R
=
∑ is the sum of the remaining revenue. The value of the risky bond rP is then equal to 
the value of a risk free bond fP reduced for a value of the put option: 
( )max 0, b
b
T
r f b b b i
i t
P P C T t R
=
⎛ ⎞= − − −⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠∑  (6-4) 
 Following Eq. (6-1), the rate of return for the holder of the risky bond can be 
derived. Thus, the difference between the risky rate rr and the risk free rate fr is the 
credit spread. As discussed earlier, the focus in this research is on the pricing of the 
revenue risk and how the price of this risk is affected by the changes in the network 
topology. Hence, the credit spread is chosen as the measure of interest for bonds. The 
changes in the credit spread as the function of changes in the capacity on links is 
presented in the following section on the network example.  
 
SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS 
 
The set of input values for Monte Carlo simulation is presented in Table 6-1. 
Same as in the simulation for the sensitivity analysis for bank loans, the length of the 
debt service bT  is set to 10 so the later comparison of results for all considered financial 
instruments will have the same base case. For the same reason, other values are the same 
as they were used for bank loans. The additional input needed for the assessment and 
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testing of the credit spread is the risk free rate fr . This value is also assumed, although 
the identification of the risk free rate of return for toll roads is subject of discussion, 
which is not addressed in this thesis. This value is taken to be the same as the drift rate 
for the GBM simulating the risk-free environment. The total value of debt scheduled for 
the repayment over time bT  is 16.8*10
6. 
 
Table 6-1. Summary of input parameters for Monte Carlo simulation for bonds 
bT  ( )0R  μ  σ  rT  ( )0
b
R
C
 fr  n  
10 2.35*106 0.05 0.2 1 1.4 0.05 100,000 
 
 
From Monte Carlo simulation, the credit spread is determined for the base case, 
that is, for the initial network topology. The credit spread for the given debt structure is 
19 basis points (basis point is a measure commonly used for the credit spread and 
representes 1/100 of percent). The stress analysis is conducted for the same marginal 
increments as it was used in bank loans. The capacity values are varied from Cmin=1,500  
to Cmax=3,500 with the marginal increment of ∆C=50 on links 1 and 3, that is, the feeder 
and the competing link, respectivly. 
As mentioned earlier, it is expected that the increase in the capacity of the feeder 
link will positivly affect risk parameters, thus add to the value of the project. As the 
capacity increase, the travel cost on the link decreases, thus attracting more traffic to it. 
As the number of trips on the feeder link increases, it will also increase the traffic on the 
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toll link and the revenue. The higher the revenue collected on the toll road, the risk of 
defaulting on the debt service will decrease. Thus, the credit spread should decrease. On 
the contrary, the increase in the capacity on the competing link will increase the credit 
spread. 
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Fig. 6-2. Changes in the credit spread 
 
Fig. 6-2 represents results of sensitivity analysis for the credit spread. The 
horizontal axis represents the percent change in the link’s capacity, and the vertical axis 
represents the percent change in the credit spread. Results are as expected since the 
increase of the capacity on the feeder link decreases the price of the revenue risk, thus 
adding the value to the project. Increase in the capacity on the competing link increases 
the price of the risk, thus increasing the credit spread.  
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However, it should be noted, as with the bank loans, that changes in the credit 
spread with the respect to changes on the feeder and the competing link are asymmetric 
and non-linear. For example, the decrease in the capacity of the feeder link has higher 
marginal impact on the credit spread than increase in the capacity on the same link. Also, 
the network improvements, which are increasing the credit spread thus detracting from 
the project’s value, on the feeder link have higher impact than improvements on the 
competing link. In other words, comparing with the base case, increase in the capacity 
on the competing link has a lower effect than decrease in the capacity on the feeder link. 
Results of the sensitivity analysis are presented in Table 6-2 for the better understanding 
of the magnitude of the effect. 
 
Table 6-2. Summary of results for bonds sensitivity analysis 
Capacity Change  ∆Credit Spread 
+10% -20% 
-10% +36% 
+20% -34% 
Feeder Link 
∆C1 
-20% +87% 
+10% +28% 
-10% -21% 
+20% +57% 
Competing Link 
∆C3 
-20% -42% 
 
 
Decrease in the credit spread happens when the capacity is added to the feeder 
link or when the capacity of the competing link is reduced. For these cases, the 
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magnitude of the effect on the credit spread is similar for both network improvement 
actions. For example, change of the capacity by ±10%, either on the competing or the 
feeder link, reduces the credit spread 20%. In contrast, the network improvement actions 
that increase the credit spread are different for those changes that increase the capacity 
on the feeder link and those that decrease the capacity on the competing link. Increasing 
the capacity on the competing link by 10% will increase the credit spread by 28%, while 
the same marginal change in the favor of decreasing the feeder link’s capacity will 
increase the credit spread by 36%. This difference between impacts on the credit spread 
because of changes on the feeder and the competing links, the impact that reduces the 
value of the project, is further increasing with the higher percentile changes of 
capacities.  
 
SUMMARY 
 
 Bonds, as the financial instrument for debt raising in PPP agreements, are 
analyzed in this chapter in the context of toll roads. The credit spread is identified as the 
difference between yields on the risk-free bond and on the risky bond. The change of the 
credit spread with the respect to changes on the feeder link and the competing link is 
assessed. This assessment and sensitivity analysis provided an insight into the 
phenomenon of impact that different network topologies have on the price of revenue 
risk thus adding to or subtracting from the value of the project.  Next chapter continues 
the analysis of financial instruments used in PPP agreements by proposing the new 
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approach for the risk mitigation between the public sector and the private sector in the 
form of using the real options. 
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CHAPTER VII 
SALVAGE AND BUY-BACK OPTIONS 
 
 Real options are used in the project finance as the tool for the risk mitigation. 
From the literature review, it has been noted that the form of the option used for the toll 
road agreements vary from different government guarantees to revenue sharing 
agreements. Also, different mathematical approaches are used. This led to the conclusion 
that the private sector and the public sector do not have the specific type or the model for 
the toll road agreements and that they may vary from the project to the project. Hence, 
the research in this area of financial instruments was focused on the development of the 
new approach for the option value assessment. Two options were analyzed: the option to 
abandon the project for the salvage value and the option to buy-back the project, as it is 
explain in detail in following section.  
 
OPTIONS VALUATIONS 
 
The option to abandon the project is an option that provides a right to the private 
sector to sell the project back to the public sector if the project does not generate enough 
profit. For the public sector, the option to abandon the project for salvage value is an 
obligation to pay an arranged price if the investor decides to exercise that option. From 
the private sector’s perspective, having this clause in the agreement adds value to the 
project since it reduces the revenue risk. 
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For the public sector, the option to buyback the project is a right to acquire the 
project back to its ownership if the profit from its operation exceeds some predetermined 
level. In this case, the owner (the public sector) has a right to buy-back the project for 
some value and to continue to operate the project and collect all future revenues. The 
uncertain revenue process defines the value of the project also as an uncertain value. 
Since one of the parameters for the option valuation is the value of the underlying 
project, project’s value is determined as the expected sum of future revenues. 
Conditions under which options can be exercised are defined as an upper and a 
lower boundary. The average revenue (AR) over some pre-specified time horizon is 
compared with these boundaries. If the AR is below or above boundaries, options can be 
exercised. This approach, with the average revenue as one of conditions for options 
calculation, overcomes the problem of yearly traffic volatility, hence revenues volatility 
risk. It allows, over pre-specified period, for traffic flows and revenues to fluctuate and 
takes into the consideration only the average revenue value.  
For considered period, AR is calculated using Monte Carlo simulation as the sum 
of the discrete values for yearly revenue for each simulated path and divided by the 
length of a time horizon. Once the value of the AR is evaluated and set, the next step is 
to, for those simulation paths for which forecasted revenue is above AR, compare the 
expected project value with the exercised price. 
First, expected value of the integral of the GBM process is explained. This 
formulation is used for the calculation of the expected project’s value over the remaining 
concession period. Consider a stochastic process in a risk neutral environment: 
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( ) ( ) ( ) tdS t rS t dt S t dWσ= +  (7-1) 
where r  is the risk-free rate and σ  is the volatility. Let’s define a time to the maturity of 
an option T  with the assumption that r and σ  are constant over time horizon[ ]0 ,t T . 
Consider the integral of a stochastic process over observed time horizon: 
0
( ) ( )
T
t
A T S y dy= ∫  (7-2) 
With the definition of the expected value of the underlying process: 
( )
0
21*exp
2t t
E S T S r t Wσ σ⎡ ⎤⎛ ⎞= − +⎡ ⎤ ⎜ ⎟⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦ ⎝ ⎠⎣ ⎦  (7-3) 
Eq. (7-2) becomes: 
( ) 0
0
2
0
1exp
2
T t
t yE A T E S r y W dyσ σ
−⎡ ⎤⎡ ⎤⎛ ⎞= − +⎡ ⎤ ⎢ ⎥⎜ ⎟⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦ ⎝ ⎠⎣ ⎦⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦∫  (7-4) 
 Geman and Yor (1993) showed that the first order moment of the process 
( )( )
0
exp 2
t
t sA s W ds
ν ν= +⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦∫  is equal to: 
[ ]( ) 1( ) exp(2 ( 1)) 1
2( 1)t
E A tν νν= + −+  (7-5) 
where 
2
2 1rν σ= −  (7-6) 
 Due to the scaling property of Brownian motion 2( ) (1 ) ( )W t a W ta=  and using 
the change of variable 24y ν σ= (Geman and Yor, 1993), Eq. (7-4) becomes: 
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∫  (7-7) 
Consider 
0 0t t
S R= and ( )A T  to be value of the project, then the expected value of the 
project [ ]E PV  determined in the time 0t  is: 
[ ] [ ]00 2 exp(2 ( 1)) 14 ( )( ) 2( 1)
hR tE PV t
ν
σ ν
+ −= +  (7-8) 
where  
2
0( )4
h T tσ= −  (7-8a) 
2
2 1rν σ= −  (7-8b) 
Time for which the average revenue value is calculated is defined as [ ]00, t  and 
an upper bound as UB and lower bound as LB. Both options are priced as European 
barrier options, which mean that they can be exercised only at the end of the option’s 
life. Option to abandon the project is considered as down-and-in barrier option and 
option to buyback the project is up-and-in barrier option. Down-and-in barrier option is 
the option for which, if the average revenue drops below lower barrier (down), the 
option becomes alive (in). Similarly, the up-and-in barrier option is the option for which, 
if the average revenue exceeds upper barrier (up), the option becomes alive (in).  Both 
options can be exercised at time 0t . For each simulated path, if the AR for[ ]00, t  is above 
UB or below LB, the value of options is calculated comparing the expected value of the 
project for the remaining period and the set exercised price (Eq. 7-9 and Eq. 7-10): 
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( ) nc
buy-back option (European call option)
C= max E[PV(t)]-K ,0  | AR ( t)>UB⎡ ⎤Δ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
 (7-9) 
( ) n
for option to abandon (European put option)
P= max Kp-E[PV(t)],0  | AR ( t)<LB⎡ ⎤Δ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
    (7-10) 
where Kc is the exercised price for the buyback option, C is the value of corresponding 
options, Kp is the exercised price for the salvage option and P is the value of that option. 
The exercised price can be considered as the cost of the initial investment in the project 
(Garvin and Cheah, 2004). 
The paths in which the buyback option is in the money (expected project’s value 
is higher than the exercised price), the public sector can exercise the option. In those 
cases, the public sector expects that the project will generate more profit than the 
required payment for this option or the exercised price. The paths in which the salvage 
option is in the money (expected project’s value is lower than the exercised price), the 
private sector can exercise the option. In this case, the private sector expects that the 
project will not generate enough revenues. The option valuation model is presented in 
Fig. 7-1. 
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Buy-back option 
C=[max(E[PV(t1)]-Kc,0) | ARn(∆t)>UB]  
Option to abandon 
P=[max(Kp-E[PV(t1)],0) | ARn(∆t)<LB]         
t1 t0 
ARn(∆t) 
AR1(∆t) 
path 1 
∆t 
R   
Projects service life (years) 
path n 
UB 
LB 
 
Fig. 7-1. Pricing the options 
 
Further explanation of options pricing is addressed by observing one path of all 
simulated revenue paths, that is, path 1 on Fig. 7-1. After time tΔ , when the option can 
be exercised, value of the ( )1AR tΔ  is determined for the period [ ]00, t  as an average of 
all revenues within that period. This average revenue is compared with the UB which is 
set in advance. Since the ( )1AR t UBΔ > , the option becomes alive. It can be exercised if 
it has positive payoff. For the simulated path 1, expected value of the project is 
determined from the Eq. (7-8) and compared with the exercised price Kc. Similarly, 
observing the path n, if the ( )nAR t LBΔ < the salvage option will be exercised if the 
expected project’s value is lower than the Kp.  
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SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS 
 
The stress analysis is conducted to examine the effect of the change in the 
network structure on options values. The stress analysis is performed for capacity 
changes of one link in the network at the time. Similarly as in previous sensitivity 
analysis, link 1 and link 3 (Fig. 4-1) are used as the feeder link and the competing link, 
respectivly. Capacities of these links are changed having all other values of network 
parameters being constant. 
The set of input values for Monte Carlo simulation is presented in the Table 7-1. 
Values are the same as they were used for bank loans and bonds so the later comparison 
of results for all considered financial instruments will have the same base case. The 
additional input needed for the assessment and testing of the options values is the upper 
bound UB, the lower bound LB,  the average revenue AR and exercised prices Kc and 
Kp. The number of simulation is 100,000n =  and the standard error SE =6.2*103.  
 
Table 7-1. Summary of input parameters for Monte Carlo simulation for options 
( )0R  μ  σ  fr  LB UB Kc Kp 
2.35*106 0.05 0.2 0.05 3*106 5*106 20*106 10*106 
 
 
From Monte Carlo simulation, option values are determined for the base case, 
that is, for the initial network topology. The stress analysis is conducted for the same 
marginal increments as it was used in the analysis of bank loans and bonds. The capacity 
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values are varied from Cmin=1,500  to Cmax=3,500 with the marginal increment of ∆C=50 
on links 1 and 3, that is, the feeder and the competing link, respectivly. 
It is expected that any increase in the capacity on the feeder link will increase the 
traffic flow and the revenue on the toll link. Consequently, the expected value of the 
project will increase, which will reduce the value of the option to abandon the project 
and increase the value of the option to buy-back the project. In contrast, if the capacity 
of the feeder link decreases, it will reduce the traffic flow and the revenue on the toll link 
thus decreasing the project’s expected value. This will cause the price of the option to 
abandon the project to alter and the price of the option to buy-back the project to decline.  
For changes in the capacity on the competing link, it is expected that any increase 
in the capacity will reduce the expected project’s value thus decreasing the value of the 
buy-back option and increasing the value of the salvage option. For network 
improvements which will lead to the decrease in the capacity on the competing link, it is 
expected that this improvements will increase the project’s value. The price of the option 
to buy-back the project will increase and the price of the option to abandon the project 
will decrease. Results of the sensitivity analysis are presented in Fig. 7-2 for the option 
to buy-back the project. The horizontal axis represents the percent change in the link’s 
capacity and the vertical axis is the percent of change in the option’s value.  
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Fig. 7-2. Effect of the change in the capacity on the value of the option to buy-back 
 
Results presented in Fig. 7-2 are as expected. The increase in the capacity on the 
feeder link caused the revenue of the project to increase, thus increasing the expected 
project’s value. As the value of the project has been increasing, the price of the option to 
buy-back the project has also been increasing. In this case, the public sector has to pay 
the higher price to buy-back the project since it is expected that the project will generate 
more revenues and thus will be worth more. Although these changes in the network 
structure reduce the revenue risk, the price of this option is increasing because these 
network improvements add to the project’s value and, since the price of the option is 
derived from the expected project’s value, having this option in the agreement will be 
worth more. The same effect is achieved if the network structure is changed through the 
reduction in the capacity of the competing link. The revenue is increasing and the 
 76
project’s value is increasing. The price of the option to buy-back the project which value 
is increasing will increase.   
In contrast, the value of the project is decreasing if the capacity of the feeder link 
is decreasing or if the capacity of the competing link is increasing. These changes in the 
network structure will cause re-distribution of traffic thus reducing the number of trips 
on the toll link. The project’s revenue will decrease as well as the expected project’s 
value. The price of the option to buy-back the project will decrease since the project’s 
worthiness is decreasing.  
However, the effects of the network improvements on the value of the option to 
buy-back the project do not have the same magnitude nor are they symmetrical. For 
example, network improvements, which lead to the decrease in the capacity on the 
competing link, have higher impact on the value of the option than the increase in the 
capacity on feeder link. As the percent of change in the capacity on the competing link is 
altered, the effect on the price of the option is also altered. However, the same percent 
change on the feeder link will not have the same magnitude of the impact on the price of 
the option. Thus, for the option to buy the project, the decrease in the competing link has 
the higher impact on the option’s value than increase in the feeder link.   
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Fig. 7-3. Effect of the change in the capacity on the value of the salvage option 
 
Fig. 7-3 represents the results of changes in the network structure on the value of 
the option to abandon the project for the salvage value. The horizontal axis represents 
the percent change in the link’s capacity and the vertical axis is the percent of change in 
the option’s value. Similarly, as in previous analysis, results are as expected. Increasing 
the capacity on the competing link or decreasing the capacity on the feeder link will 
cause the reduction of the revenue and the project’s value. The price of the option to 
abandon the project which value is decreasing will increase. In contrast, if the value of 
the project is increasing by adding the capacity on the feeder link or reducing the 
capacity on the competing link, the project will worth more and thus the price of the 
option will decrease.  
However, the results for the changes in the capacity on the competing and the 
feeder link are non-linear and asymmetrical. For example, marginal impact of the 
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reduced capacity on the feeder link is higher than the impact of the increase of the 
capacity on the competing link. Although both network improvements actions have the 
same effect, reducing the revenue on the toll road and thus reducing the project’s value, 
the magnitude of the change on the option’s price is not the same. For the option to 
abandon the project for the salvage value, the change on the feeder link has a higher 
effect.  
For better understanding of the magnitude of the change in options values, results 
of the sensitivity analysis for both options are presented in Table 7-2.  
 
Table 7-2. Summary of results for options sensitivity analysis 
Capacity Change  ∆Value of the buy-back option 
∆Value of the salvage 
option 
+10% +54% -34% 
-10% -43% +69% 
+20% +114% -58% 
Feeder Link 
∆C1 
-20% -70% +190% 
+10% -38% +49% 
-10% +67% -40% 
+20% -58% +118% 
Competing 
Link 
∆C3 
-20% +158% -66% 
 
 
For the value of the buy back option, decrease occurs when the capacity on the 
feeder link is decreased or when the capacity on the competing link is increased. For 
example, if the capacity on link 1 is increased by 10%, the value of the option will 
increase by 54%. The opposite marginal change on link 3 will increase by 67%. If the 
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magnitude of these changes rises to 20% than the value of the option will increase by 
114%, for the change on link 1, and 158%, for the change on link 3.   
In contrast, the increase in the value of the salvage option appears when the 
capacity increases on the competing link or decreases on the feeder link. Increase in the 
capacity of the competing link 3 by 10% will increase the value by 49%. If the capacity 
on the feeder link 1 is decreased by 10%, it will increase the value by 69%. Similarly, if 
these marginal changes on capacities rise to 20%, the impact on the value significantly 
alters. The increase in the value for the change on the link 3 is 118% while for the 
change on the link 1 is 190%. The impact is thus significantly different for network 
improvements actions on the feeder link 1 and the competing link 3. 
 
SUMMARY 
 
 In this chapter, two options are presented as the tool used for the risk mitigation 
in the negotiation phase between the public sector and the private sector for toll road 
agreements. Both options are priced as the European boundary options. The approach for 
the option pricing with the use of the stochastic integral for GBM as the method for the 
calculation of the expected project’s value is proposed. Sensitivity analysis is conducted 
for different network topologies and results are analyzed with the respect to changes in 
options values. This chapter concludes the analysis of three financial instruments used in 
toll road agreements: bank loans, bonds, and real options. The following chapter 
provides an overview and discussion of results. 
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CHAPTER VIII 
OVERVIEW OF RESULTS 
 
Sensitivity analyses are performed for marginal changes in the capacity on the 
feeder and the competing link identified in the simple network example. Each financial 
instrument is analyzed separately and the results were as expected. This has validated 
assumptions and mathematical models used to establish the base case as the case when 
there are no changes in the network.   
Fig. 8-1 represents the overview of results obtained from the sensitivity analyses. 
The horizontal axis represents the percent of change in the capacity on the link and the 
vertical axis represents the percent change in the risk parameter. Risk parameters were 
identified in previous chapters for each financial instrument. For example, for bank 
loans, risk weighted assets (RWA) is used since it represents the risk weight of the loan 
in the bank’s required capital. Credit spread is used as the risk parameter for bonds since 
it represents the difference on the rate of return between a risk free bond and a risky 
bond. Price of the buy-back and the salvage option is used as the risk parameter since the 
private sector and the public sector are interested in this value, as it is the price of the 
risk mitigation strategy.  
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Fig. 8-1. Overview of results 
 
 Results indicate that the credit spread, as one of the analyzed risk parameters, is 
the least sensitive to the changes in the network structure.  Changes in the network 
topology that increase the price of the revenue risk have a higher impact on the credit 
spread than changes that will decrease the credit spread. The same result is noticable for 
other risk parameters: the effect of the increase in the price of the revenue risk is higher 
than the effect of the decrease in the price for the same marginal changes in the network 
structure. 
 Prices of options to buy-back the project or to abandon the project are next in the 
sensitivity categorization. Prices of these two options will be significantly altered by any 
change in the network that will increase the price. Depending on the type of the option 
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analyzed, the change in the feeder link or the change in the competing link will have a 
higher impact. For example, the price of the option to buy-back the project will be more 
altered by the decrease in the capacity on the competing link than the increase in the 
capacity on the feeder link. In contrast, the price of the salvage option will be more 
altered by the decrease in the capacity on the feeder link than the increase in the capacity 
on the competing link.  
 The risk parameter identified in the analisys of bank loans, RWA, is the most 
sensitive to the changes in the network structure. The change in the risk weight is 
significantly altered by the decrease in the capacity on the feeder link and the increase in 
the capacity on the competing link. However, changes on the feeder link that add to the 
price of the revenue risk have a higher impact than changes in the competing link with 
the same effect.  
In the context of these results, project participants gain an information about the 
sensitivity of financial instruments to changes in the network topology. For example, if 
the private sector has a bank loan raised for the project, obligation to repay the project’s 
bonds and a clause in the agreement with the public sector about the option to abandon 
the project, it should expect that the price of the bank’s loan will be the most affected by 
the changes in the initial network topology. Also, changes on feeder links can be more 
important for consideration than changes on competing links, thus making the non-
competing clause in the agreement, as defined in the literature review, insufficient and 
incomplete. 
 
 83
CHAPTER IX 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
In this chapter, the summary of this research is presented along with conclusions 
and recommendations for future research. 
 
SUMMARY 
 
 Development, delivery, and operation of public infrastructure is becoming 
increasingly dependent on participation of the private sector. While revenue generating 
projects such as toll roads were traditionally developed and funded from the public 
sources, in recent years, as the public demand for new projects have exceeded the ability 
of the public sector to deliver them, the private investors have started to fulfill a gap 
between the needed and the available infrastructure. 
 However, the participation of the private sector in PPP agreements is constrained 
by the availability of funds thus putting the financial institutions in the role of lenders in 
these agreements. The scheme of the PPP agreements and the interaction among 
project’s participants are very complex. Due to this complexity, there are numerous 
associated risks, but one risk can be distinguished as the core of the project’s financial 
feasibility: the revenue risk.  
This research examines the correlation of the revenue risk and the three most 
commonly used financial instruments in PPP agreements: bank loans, bonds and real 
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options. The research problem was identified as the need for the identification and the 
quantification of the effect that changes in the network structure has on the project’s 
financial feasibility. All project participants are affected by changes in the network 
topology, but the remaining question is: what is the impact of these changes on project 
participants? It is considered that all participants are most interest in the financial aspect 
of the project and financial instruments used in PPP agreements. Hence, the research 
question is formulated as: how will these network improvements affect the revenue on the 
toll road and the project’s financial feasibility? The objective of the research was to 
develop the method that will allow an assessment of this effect on above-mentioned 
financial instruments.  
For better understanding of the effects that different network topologies have on 
project’s financial viability, the sensitivity analysis is conducted for different marginal 
changes in the capacities on the feeder and the competing links. The overview of results 
is presented in the following section. 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
 The objective of this research was to develop the method that will allow an 
assessment of the effect that the public sector decisions regarding the network 
improvements have on the toll road financial feasibility. Financial feasibility is defined 
through the identification of the three most commonly used financial instruments in PPP 
agreements. The proposed method was tested through the sensitivity analysis with 
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respect to different network topologies. Obtained results were as expected which was 
taken as the validity test of the method. Thus, it is anticipated that the proposed method 
is a valuable tool, which will add to the current practice because it has the following 
properties: 
• It creates a solid basis for the objective assessment of the impact that 
decisions made by the public sector, regarding the network improvements, 
have on financial instruments;  
• It provides a tool for quantification of the impact that these changes in the 
network structure have on the project’s financial feasibility; and  
• It builds a common ground which ensures that the decisions made by the 
public sector are interpreted in a meaningful manner for project managers and 
decision makers, that is, the public sector, the private sector and financial 
institutions. 
Obtained results from the sensitivity analysis indicate that the changes in the network 
structure have an impact on the projects financial feasibility. However, the magnitude of 
this impact depends on the type of the network improvement (decreasing or increasing 
the capacity on the link), the position of the link in the network (the feeder or the 
competing link) and the type of financial instrument. From obtained results and provided 
analyses, following conclusions are derived: 
• Consideration and identification of feeder and competing links in the network 
is an important topic which should be considered in the negotiation phase 
between all project participants; 
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• Among analyzed financial instruments, the credit spread is the least sensitive 
to the network improvements and the risk weighted asset is the most 
sensitive; 
• Increasing the revenue risk price is easier to achieve by implementing the 
network improvement actions than to decrease the price. 
 
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
 
 This research has been concluded with the development of the method for the 
assessment of the effect that different network improvement actions have on selected 
financial instruments. The analysis of the financial instruments, in future research, could 
be expanded to include sensitivity of the rate of return on the equity invested. Also, the 
analysis of the above mentioned effects on the operation and maintenance costs can 
provide valuable information for project participants.  
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